Factbox: Examiner's findings of claims against Lehman officers
The report by a court-appointed examiner into the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc, the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history, was made public on Thursday.
Below is a list of the findings of colorable claims against various officers. The report describes such claims as those in which there is sufficient credible evidence to support a finding by a trier of fact.
RICHARD FULD: The examiner found evidence for breach of fiduciary duty against the former chief executive for not investigating whether the company was deceiving investors about its leverage by using a repurchase and sale program, known as Repo 105.
The report found that Fuld knew or should have known the company's use of Repo 105 reduced its balance sheet by $49.1 billion in the first quarter of 2008 and $50.4 billion in the second quarter of 2008.
There is sufficient credible evidence to support a determination that Fuld's failure to make a deliberate decision about Lehman's disclosure obligations was grossly negligent or demonstrated a conscious disregard of his duties.
The report said Fuld said he did not recollect discussions of the Repo 105 program.
CHRIS O'MEARA: The examiner said company's chief financial officer from December 2004 to December 2007, actively managed the Repo 105 program. The report said increasing the size of the program required O'Meara's approval. The examiner found that O'Meara set balance sheet targets and leverage ratios at a time when the company was trying to reduce its holdings of souring loans and investments.
The Examiner finds there is sufficient evidence to support a colorable claim that O'Meara breached his fiduciary duties by permitting the expansion of Lehman's Repo 105 practice, the report said.
The report said the O'Meara said he had limited knowledge of the Repo 105 program.
ERIN CALLAN: Lehman's chief financial officer from December 2007 to June 2008 was warned that the Repo 105 program was a headline risk to the company and could damage its reputation if it became public, according to the examiner. She was also told by the company's global financial controller that no competitors used similar programs.
The report also cited her comments on a call to analysts in which she cited asset sales for the company's deleveraging, rather than the use the off-balance sheet repo program.
Callan thus had ample red flags to alert her to potential problems arising from Lehman's Repo 105 program before she signed Lehman's first quarter form 10Q. Callan ignored these red flags, said the report.
Callan told the examiner her concerns about the program fell by the wayside because of more pressing issues, such as the collapse of rival investment bank, Bear Stearns.
IAN LOWITT: Lehman's chief financial officer from June 2008 was aware of failed attempts to place real estate securities into the Repo 105 and was told of funding problems with counterparties in the program.
There is sufficient evidence to support a finding by the trier of fact that Lowitt was at least grossly negligent in causing Lehman to file materially misleading financial statements, said the report.
The report said the officers may be liable to Lehman if the company is subject to liability as result of their actions.
The report said there is no evidence to support claims for breach of fiduciary duty against any members of the board, except for Fuld.
(Reporting by Tom Hals; Editing by Tim Dobbyn)
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